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Homeostasis is not a permanent and stable state but instead results from conflicting
forces. Therefore, infants have to engage in dynamic exchanges with their environment,
in biological, cognitive, and affective domains. Empathy is an adaptive response to these
environmental challenges, which contributes to reaching proper dynamic homeostasis and
development. Empathy relies on implicit interactive processes, namely probabilistic percep-
tion and synchrony, which will be reviewed in the article. If typically-developed neonates are
fully equipped to automatically and synchronously interact with their human environment,
conduct disorders (CD) and autism spectrum disorders (ASD) present with impairments
in empathetic communication, e.g., emotional arousal and facial emotion processing. In
addition sensorimotor resonance is lacking in ASD, and emotional concern and semantic
empathy are impaired in CD with Callous-Unemotional traits.
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Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and conduct disorders (CD) are
both of public health concern. Prevalence for ASD reaches 0.7% in
general population (1), while CD bears high social burden, espe-
cially CD with high callous-unemotional traits (CD-HCU), with
elevated rate of violent crime. Both disorders are associated with
social maladjustment and impaired communication and empa-
thy. Within an evolutionary perspective, empathy is an adaptive
response to the continuously challenging social environment and
an efficient means to reach homeostasis. With respect to key con-
cepts such as homeostasis, perception, and synchrony, the present
article will review the development of empathy in typically-
developed (TD) youth before addressing empathy impairments
pertaining to ASD and CD-HCU.
DYNAMIC HOMEOSTASIS AND EMPATHY
Homeostasis, which is marked by extreme instability according
to Cannon (2), cannot be obtained without exchanges with the
environment. Disequilibrium is a basic characteristic of human
beings. Humans cannot survive on their own and must engage in
dynamic exchanges with their physical and human environment.
Revisiting Cannon’s definition of homeostasis, Arminjon et al. (3)
appropriately stressed that homeostasis is not referring to a per-
manent and stable state but instead results from the interaction
of conflicting forces. The newborn’s innate propensity to com-
municate with other humans allows for searching the biological,
cognitive, and affective inputs required for his/her development.
Empathy encompasses the cognitive mechanisms, which provide
security and cohesiveness among these conflicting interactions.
Such mechanisms have been traced back in primates and other
mammals (4, 5). From an evolutionary standpoint, empathy is an
adaptive mechanism to help secure individuals’ development and
survival.
Empathy refers to the intuitive access to others’ subjective
experience (6). It denotes the individual’s capacity to under-
stand others’ intents and experience their feelings. Empathy is
currently conceived as a cognitive capacity, which supports indi-
viduals’ ability to behave with respect to socially relevant infor-
mation. Empathy is not a unitary function and encompasses three
processes, which successively appear as the child matures: pro-
cedural/implicit, semantic, and biographical empathy. Procedural
empathy refers to the innate and non-conscious capacity to res-
onate with others’ emotional states. Procedural empathy itself
encompasses three components seen in neonates and primates:
sensorimotor resonance, also called motor contagion, emotional
arousal/contagion, and empathetic concern. Sensorimotor reso-
nance supports behavioral (7) and neural (8) mirror activations.
Emotional arousal is the emotional contagion resulting in sim-
ilar emotion being aroused in the observer as a response to
the expressed emotion of another (8). Empathetic concern is an
“other-oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived
welfare of someone in need” (8). It results from the attachment
system, which develops between the infant and his/her primary
caregivers (9). Semantic empathy parallels language development
and expresses connection between words, meaning, and emotion.
All these processes take place before the installation of theory of
mind when the child turns four. Biographical empathy emerges
later in life and corresponds to the interweaving of personal expe-
rience with feelings and words, together with a capacity to bridge
with others’ experiences.
Over the past decade, electrophysiological (ERP) and neu-
roimaging studies, especially on others’ pain perception, have shed
light on the neural underpinnings of empathy. Because emo-
tions are expressed through facial mimicry, the neural circuitry of
empathy lies at the crossroads of networks involved in attention,


























































emotional arousal, face perception, intent recognition and self-
awareness (agency). Pain ERP studies have elicited a very early
response occurring at 60 ms after exposure to a painful visual stim-
ulus (10, 11). High-density ERP with brain source analysis tech-
niques identified the signal source in the right temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ), a cortical area bridging visual and attentional cor-
tical pathways with amygdala and prefrontal networks. Such acti-
vation discriminated between intentional and accidental harmful
behaviors. Previous neuroimaging studies conducted by the same
group have identified TPJ as a pivotal network in discriminat-
ing self and other actions (agency) (8). Later potentials have been
identified around 120 ms after stimulus onset over the amygdala or
the anterior cingulum depending on the study. This 120 ms nega-
tivity is usually viewed as arousal response combining attentional
and emotional reactiveness. Of note, negative potentials occurring
around 170 ms after stimulus onset are specifically associated with
face processing (12). Later activations denote prefrontal recruit-
ments and contributions from top-down regulation mechanisms.
In sum, ERP studies point to the earliness of cognitive responses
triggered by the intent and emotional value associated with the
stimulus, even before its shape and identity are fully disclosed.
Neuroimaging studies on empathy for pain provide results
complementary to ERP data. FMRI studies have consistently
stressed the association between empathy and activation of regions
such as the anterior insula, anterior cingulate, and amygdala. On
the contrary, the involvement of sensorimotor areas is still unclear.
Studies diverge on whether pain direct and vicarious experiences
recruit the same brain sensorimotor and limbic networks. Observ-
ing pain in someone else is associated with partial activation of
the pain matrix recruited when experiencing oneself pain, namely
anterior insula/fronto-insular cortex and the anterior cingulate
cortex (13). Activation of the sensorimotor and somatosensory
cortices seemed to be restricted to direct painful experiences.
Recent studies, however, have shown the activation of sensory cor-
tices (14) and motor cortices (15) in perception of other’s pain.
These findings lent support to the existence of a separate although
empathy-related network responsible for sensorimotor contagion.
In sum, apart from subcortical structures as amygdala, empathy
networks encompass prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices as
well as interconnected areas like insula and TPJ. These cortical net-
works indirectly receive information from visceral sensory systems
about internal homeostasis, which impacts their activation (16).
PROBABILISTIC PERCEPTION AND PARENT–INFANT
SYNCHRONY
Infant’s early empathy behaviors rely on non-conscious and innate
procedural/implicit cognitive processes, which themselves depend
on the perception of auditory and visual social cues. Such cues
attest to the presence of care givers in the infant’s environment.
Although sensory inputs are basically continuous and ambiguous,
infants as young as 8-month-old have been shown to be capa-
ble of word discrimination. This capability seems to result from
statistical learning processes (17). Infants can detect within the
continuous voice flow statistical patterns (e.g., pairwise associ-
ation between letters and syllables) that serve as a cue to word
boundaries (18, 19). Each sensory input gives rise not only to one
interpretation but also to a large range of inferences regarding the
true state of the perceived environment (20). This probabilistic
perception allows for building up an internal model of rhythms,
objects, and people, which are the source of sensory inputs. This
internal model is subsequently modified according to subsequent
sensory inputs.
In naturalistic settings, subsequent inputs are provided through
interactions between parents and infant. Parents’ vocalizations,
called infant-directed-speech (IDS) or motherese (21), trigger the
infant’s vocalizations, which in turn lead to parental responses.
As observed in family home videos, parents and infant interac-
tions gradually evolve toward a synchronous pattern of mutual
attention, speech, and gestures without any conscious intent from
the participants (22). Following Delaherche et al. (23), synchrony
could be viewed as the dynamic and reciprocal adjustment to the
temporal structure of interactive behaviors and emotions between
communication partners, e.g., mother and infant smiling at each
other and babbling together during feeding time. Synchrony,
which constitutes the core phenomenon of empathy, is probably
the main factor sustaining probabilistic perception and learning.
Infants identify probabilistic patterns within verbal interactions
with their parents. How such patterns of co-occurring vocal
sounds get selected and merged with the infant’s internal model of
the perceived environment? One could stress the frequency of these
co-occurrences. Another explanation would be that the parental
synchronous response operates as a validation of the infant’s prob-
abilistic perception mechanisms. Synchrony induces a selection
within the perception inferences aroused by sensory inputs. Con-
sequently, it enhances the formation of shared representations of
the perceived verbal environment between infant and parents. It
could be one of the mechanisms by which social interaction affects
implicit learning (24). According to this hypothesis, synchrony
would foster language acquisition in non-verbal infants.
Synchrony not only implies cognitive but also bodily processes.
Damasio (16) emphasized the involvement of brain–body path-
ways, including autonomous nervous system, which shape com-
posite and dynamic maps of the body’s state from moment to
moment. Biological expressions of synchrony have been consis-
tently demonstrated through vagal tone modulation and oxytocin
secretion during mother–infant interactions (25, 26).
In keeping with the framework of dynamic homeostasis, prob-
abilistic perception theory gives to perception, a definite char-
acteristic of incompleteness and disequilibrium. Such mecha-
nisms require, in turn, appropriate response from the environ-
ment to achieve adequate perception. Homeostasis is achieved
through synchronous non-conscious exchanges between parents
and infant. Synchrony is the common basic mechanism, which
underlies mirror mechanisms observed at neural and cognitive
levels in neuroimaging and ERP studies on empathy.
EMPATHY AND DYNAMIC HOMEOSTASIS IN TYPICALLY
DEVELOPED INFANTS
Decety and Svetlova (8) put together ontegenetic and phylogenetic
perspectives to set up an evolutionary model of the development
of empathy. Several adaptations of cognitive processes, both pro-
cedural/implicit and explicit, have been added to the social brain
across evolution. Rather than ended up with a well coordinated
structure of empathy mechanisms, it seemed that evolution led


























































to a “patchwork of additions” encompassing various processes,
each with a distinct evolutionary history and neural networking,
and a parallel although interdependent functioning. Among the
procedural mechanisms, self-awareness (agency), which allows for
discriminating between self-generated actions and others’ behav-
iors, seems to be human-specific. Other human-specific mecha-
nisms, like explicit processes, which prevent emotional upsets and
regulate emotional concern capacities, operate gradually over the
child development according to caregivers inputs. Such a complex
and interactive construct allows for a wide range of flexibility and
adaptive responses to environmental challenges.
Synchrony, which plays a pivotal role in developing empa-
thy, stems from early interactions in utero and all across infant
development since birth. It affects the infant’s first perceptions
whatever the different sensory modalities and triggers unimodal
and crossmodal parental responses,although studies report mainly
on auditory and visual social stimuli. Premature babies present syl-
labic discrimination capacities and voice recognition by the 28th
week of gestation (27) and the fetuses show indication of maternal
voice recognition in by the 34th week of gestation (28). A pattern
of synchronous parent–infant vocalizations has been observed
in family home videos with TD infants showing the impact of
synchrony on infant language development (21). During second
semester, the parents’ motherese (vs. other speech) is significantly
followed by more infant’s vocalizations. In a recent neuroimaging
study, synchrony was associated with mother’s brain activations
in the dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC), cuneus, fusiform, supple-
mentary motor and TPJ cortices, dACC being the most sensitive
area to the mother’s synchronous response to her infant (29).
With regard to visual processing, first-trimester-old neonates
demonstrate preference for the upper part of human faces and
gaze-following capacities. By 6-months of age, infants allocate
increased attention to angry faces with direct eye gaze as well as
to fearful faces looking toward objects and objects that are gaze-
cued by a fearful face (30, 31). Behavioral sensorimotor resonance,
the capacity to imitate complex specific facial mimicry, has been
shown in newborns as early as a few days-old infants (7). This
automatic mimicry disappears by 3-months of age as these implicit
mechanisms are replaced by more adaptive responses proper to the
particular affective context of interactions between the infant and
his/her caregivers. Twelve-month-old infants tend to read other
humans’ intentions beyond the observed behavior and attribute
discriminate goals to others (32, 33). These results, pointing to
early forms of self-awareness, are consistent with experiments
demonstrating the infant’s early discriminate reactivity to his/her
own recorded cry in comparison to the cry of another baby (34).
More elaborated and explicit self-awareness/agency processes later
develop in the second year of life alongside perspective-taking
increasing capabilities (35) and spatial abilities (36).
Taken together, it seems that neonates are cognitively equipped
to detect environmental threats and others’ intents. On the oppo-
site, their capability to respond adaptively to such inputs depends
on the context, especially the ability of their human environment
to decode in return their emotion and intent to perform actions.
As a consequence, automatically elicited implicit detection and
response processes tend to vanish over the course of infant devel-
opment to be replaced by contextually developed more adaptive
mechanisms with regard to the specific context of the infant’s rela-
tionships with his/her caregivers. At birth perceptual and neural
systems are wired to be sensitive to social information, and with age
prefrontal and limbic networks get more matured and connected,
allowing for more contextually and experience-driven interactions
(8). These developmental processes allow for achieving proper
dynamic homeostasis.
EMPATHY AND DYNAMIC HOMEOSTASIS IN AUTISM
SPECTRUM DISORDERS
Autism spectrum disorders are associated with major impair-
ments in social communication and adaptation, as well as self-
awareness/agency immaturity (37). Disturbances and alternative
cognitive processes affecting perception and empathy, especially
procedural systems, have been identified over the past decades.
These cognitive characteristics put the ASD child’s homeostasis
achievements at stake (Figure 1). The child often asks for repet-
itive activities and interactions while relying mainly on personal
inputs, rather than bridging with others, to maintain homeostasis.
In keeping with seminal studies of Saffran et al. (18), research
has been conducted to explore probabilistic perceptual mecha-
nisms used in ASD (38). Individuals with ASD are less susceptible
of perceptual illusions and less influenced by acquired expertise
on perceived objects. Since perception in ASD is less constraint by
previously memorized organization of sensory inputs, it might
slow down new acquisition and adaptation in ordinary social
context while providing more perceptual accuracy in unexpected
situations.
Spontaneous mimicry, observed in TD infants, is lacking in
ASD (39) whereas voluntary mimicry is often preserved (40). Sen-
sorimotor resonance, as measured by spectral EEG (41) and ERP
(15, 42) is impaired in ASD. In a study on self and other pain
perception, in contrast to TD participants, adults with Asperger
Disorder did not show any modification of motor-evoked poten-
tials corresponding to the muscle vicariously affected by pain
(15). Since mimicry and facial emotion discrimination implied
recruiting somatosensory-related cortices (42), impairment in
facial emotion detection observed in ASD could be related to a
lack of activation of sensorimotor cortical networks.
Behavioral as well as neuroimaging studies on fearful facial
emotion have elicited an abnormal pattern of emotional arousal.
Individuals with ASD, adults (43), and children (35), gazed more
often away from than toward the eyes in comparison with a TD
group. ASD adults showed increased amygdala activity when the
eyes included in the fearful facial stimulus appeared at the initial
location of the fixation point, compared with initial fixation at
the mouth and compared with the TD individuals (43). In the
experiment, increased initial amygdala activation was associated
with subsequent gazing off the fearful stimulus. This reaction pat-
tern differs from TD infants whose attention is attracted by fearful
faces.
At first glance, semantic empathy seemed to be less impacted in
ASD, since behavioral studies using facial emotion categorization
tasks did not yield significant differences between ASD and TD
groups, even when using multimodal sensory inputs (44). How-
ever, significant differences were retrieved when the experiments
imply a sequential presentation of the stimuli, thus involving a


























































FIGURE 1 | Development of empathy in early childhood.
working memory component (45). This result is consistent with
observations from Pellicano and Burr (38) on visual expertise. In
addition, neuroimaging studies stressed the alternative recruiting
strategies observed in ASD adults and children. In comparison to
TD participants, ASD children showed less activation in fusiform
gyrus (46), an area which would undergo cortical thinning later in
child development (47). It suggests that ASD children use more
configurational and less emotion-driven information than TD
while processing facial emotion (46).
A wide area is offered to further researches, including the explo-
ration of synchronous social processing between ASD children
and their caregivers in order to assess the impact of synchrony on
social learning. Analyses of naturalistic home videos with infants,
who later developed ASD already showed an increase in parental
stimulation and IDS during the second semester (48). Clinical
observations tend to support that attachment processes, and con-
sequently empathetic concern, the third component of procedural
empathy, are relatively preserved despite some impairments in the
perception of others’ needs. Therefore given procedural empathy
impairments, homeostasis dynamics in family affected with ASD
would be modified, offering the child with more adaptive parental
homeostatic responses.
EMPATHY AND DYNAMIC HOMEOSTASIS IN CONDUCT
DISORDERS WITH HIGH CALLOUS-UNEMOTIONAL TRAITS
Conduct disorders with high callous-unemotional traits (CD-
HCU), also called psychopathy, is a CD subgroup with a restricted
emotional expression, callous lack of regard for others, and severe
violent behavior against people (49). Although the complete syn-
drome appears in childhood with later reorganization related to
the evolution of peer-relationships in adolescence, precursors can
be traced back to infancy [for a review see Ref. (50)]. A few stud-
ies, exploring empathy, have been conducted on pain detection
and facial emotion processing.
Sensorimotor resonance, as measured by attenuation of the µ
band (8–12 Hz in central region), appeared unaffected in both
CD-HCU and CD-LCU male adolescents while observing pain in
others (51). However, no frontal N120 increase was observed in
CD-HCU, indicating attenuated emotional arousal compared to
TD and CD-LCU controls. While processing pain, CD-HCU par-
ticipants exhibited significantly less activation in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and lateral orbitofrontal cortex, but greater acti-
vation in the insula, compared with CD-LCU (52). Low emotional
arousal was equally observed in Adolescents with CD-HCU, while
processing fearful faces compared to CD-LCU and TD controls
(53). Clinical observations indicate that empathy concern, another
procedural empathy process which is related to attachment, is
impaired. Parental deficits in empathy, which were known to con-
tribute to CD in their offspring (50,54),might impede the develop-
ment of a proper attachment system and consequently mediate the
lack of emotional concern observed in CD-HCU children. Deficits
in semantic empathy have been consistently found in CD, namely
fear-recognition deficit and hostility bias in labeling facial emo-
tion (55, 56) [for a review see Ref. (57)]. In addition, impairments
in biographical empathy would be expected, given the associa-
tion between early life adversities and child maltreatment, and
CD (58).
In sum, several components of procedural empathy are affected
in CD-HCU compared to CD-LCU and controls. Emotional
arousal for pain and fear is decreased as well as empathetic con-
cern. Semantic empathy is impaired with a propensity to dismiss
fearful faces and label neutral faces as hostile (Figure 1).



























































Recent pilot studies on short-term remediation programs address-
ing specific ASD empathy impairments yielded promising results
with measurable improvements in face processing skills of ASD
children (59). Given the decrease in emotional arousal and seman-
tic empathy for fear observed in psychopathy, computerized
cognitive remediation has been proposed to CD-HCU youths,
training them to focus on the eyes of fearful faces. Pilot studies
showed that such cognitive remediation programs can ameliorate
fear-recognition deficits (53, 56).
CONCLUSION
If TD neonates are fully equipped to synchronously interact with
their human environment, ASD and CD-HCU present with dis-
turbances in emotional arousal and facial emotion processing.
In addition sensorimotor resonance is lacking in ASD, and emo-
tional concern and semantic empathy are impaired in CD-HCU.
These impairments prevent ASD and CD-HCU to achieve proper
homeostasis. Further research is needed for exploring probabilis-
tic perception mechanisms in these clinical populations on the
one hand and, on the other hand, investigating patterns of co-
activation between mother and infant with neuroimaging and
electrophysiology.
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